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I. INTRODUCTION
Attention in recent national publications is being focused upon re-
ports that there exists a dearth of children available for adoption, and,
as a result, many potentially good homes remain childless. In part, this
is the result of liberalized abortion laws, and, in part, it is the result of the
new morality which permits unwed mothers as well as unwed couples
to keep their illegitimate children.' This, however, is not the whole story.
What these articles are generally referring to is the fact that there are
not enough white infants for all the white families seeking to adopt a
child. There are, however, a large number of black babies as well as other
children, both white and black, who, because of age or other handicaps,
are difficult to place and thus remain in the care of state welfare depart-
ments. It is these children with whom this comment is primarily con-
cerned.2
Although each state has its own adoption laws with considerably
varying requisites, one common thread is evident in all instances-the
paramount consideration must be the best interests of the child. Whether
it is the agency or the court that determines the suitability of the adop-
tive applicant, all are guided by the principle of what will best serve the
child's welfare. Within this framework there exists vastly divergent
* Associate Editor, University of Miami Law Review.
1. L. GROW, A NEW LOOK AT SUPPLY AND DEMAND IN ADOPTION 1 (Child Welfare League
of America 1970).
2. The Child Welfare League of America reported that of 60 agencies supplying informa-
tion there was a 7% decrease in the total number of children accepted for adoption between
1969 and 1970. "However, while there was an 11% decrease in white children accepted be-
tween 1969 and 1970, there was an 18% increase in the number of non-White children
accepted." The majority of these non-white children are black. Grow and Smith, Adoption
Trends:. .1969-1970, in CH.n WELFARE 401 (July 1971) [hereinafter cited as Adoption
Trends] .. ....
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interpretations. The importance of the emotional as well as spiritual and
physical needs of the child is universally recognized.' Until recently, how-
ever, these needs were considered to be met only by adoption into a
"matched" family. A matched family refers to a family with a husband
and wife of child bearing age, and of the same race and religion as that
of the child. While such matching would seem most desirable, the fact
remains that strict adherence to this standard often precludes other adop-
tions with the result that many black, older, or otherwise difficult to place
children4 are shunted from one foster home to another or remain in an
institution.
The objects of this comment are to trace the developing trends
within the different traits that comprise a "matched" family, and to pro-
pose that the test of the "best interests of the child" take an additional
dimension. The additional dimension involves the question: What are the
best interests of the child in view of the alternatives available if the child
is not adopted by the immediate applicant?
II. MATCHING REQUIREMENTS
A. Background
There is no common law rule of adoption. It is purely a creature of
statute;5 and, although a Uniform Adoption Act has been developed, very
few states have enacted it.' Consequently, each state has its own re-
quirements as to who may adopt. Some have specific restrictions against
interracial or interreligious placements,7 while others have few require-
ments.' However, in practice, a mere lack of specific requirements in a
given statute is not necessarily indicative of a liberal adoption procedure. 9
Before an adoption becomes final, an agency's report either recommend-
3. O'Connell, The Adoption Muddle: A Possible Solution, 15 N.Y.L.F. 759, 764 (1969)
[hereinafter cited as O'Connell].
4. The hard-to-place child is one who falls in one or more of the following categories:
1. one year of age or older; 2. having a physical, mental, or emotional handicap; or 3. dif-
ficult to place due to race, ethnic background, color, or language. H. PIERCE MARKLEY, JR.,
COMMITTEE OF HEALTH & REHABILITATIVE SERVICES, FLORIDA HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
STAFF REPORT OF ADOPTION SERVICES IN THE STATE OF FLORIDA 12 (Dec. 1970) [hereinafter
cited as STAFF REPORT].
5. 2 AM. JUR. 2d Adoptions § 2 (1962).
6. UNIFORM ADOPTION ACT, 9 U.L.A. See also MONT. REV. CODES ANN. §§ 61-201-
61-218 (1947) ; OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, §§ 60.1-60.23 (1966).
7. See, e.g., on race restrictions, LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9.422 (1965); Mo. ANN. STAT.
§ 453.130 (1952); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-533 (1962). E.g., for religious restrictions, MASS.
GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 210, § 5B (1970); N.Y. SOCIAL WELF. LAW § 373 (McKinney 1966).
8. E.g., MD. ANN. CODE art. 16, § 67 (Supp. 1970); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 9:3-21-3-36
(1960); S.D. CoMP. LAWS ANN. § 25-6 (1967).
9. For instance, although FLA. STAT. § 63.061 (1969) allows adoption by singe people, in
practice, the Department of Health & Rehabilitative Services does not permit adoptions
by white single adults. Letter from Margaret Ward; Supervisor, Adoption Programs, Bureau
of Children's Services, Div. of Family Services, Dept. of Health & Rehab. Services, Fla.,
to author, March 3, 1971, [hereinafter cited as Margaret Ward Letter].
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ing or rejecting the adopting applicant is usually required, and this report
carries great weight in court proceedings. 0 Thus, legal force is given to
the agency's rules and practices concerning eligible parents. The agency's
refusal to recommend placement of a child with a particular applicant,
though theoretically reviewable by the courts, is rarely challenged."' As a
result, it is not always possible to ascertain how rigidly a particular state
will view the individual requirements that define a "matched" family.
However, in each of the different areas of matching, certain discernible
trends appear to be emerging.
B. Race
Although the number of non-white children available for adoption
has continued to increase, 12
[t]he percentage of all children adopted who are black or belong
to other minority races has not risen significantly despite special
efforts by social agencies to find adoptive homes for them. In
1969, children from these groups represented an estimated 11
percent of all children adopted ....
This is an increase of only 2 percent since 1957.1 "Until such time as the
pool of non-white homes is expanded substantially," transracial adop-
tions might provide the necessary homes for these children."
While most statutes do not specifically mention race, 6 there is no
question but that it is an important consideration in any adoption pro-
ceeding and that many placements are blocked because of it.'7 Whether
an interracial adoption can be accomplished is ultimately determined by
the courts and by the judge's own determination of what would serve the
child's best interests. Because of the court's great reliance on an agency's
recommendation, the policy of the agency often has the force of law."s
Few cases have been decided directly on the issue of transracial adop-
tions. However in one such case, In re Gomez, 9 the Texas statute forbid-
10. See In re St. John, 51 Misc. 2d 96, 272 N.Y.S.2d 817 (Family Ct. 1966) where it
was held that no adoption could be granted by the court without agency approval, because
without such approval the court would have no jurisdiction.
11. H. CLARK, THE LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS 641 (1968).
12. See note 2 supra.
13. U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND WELFARE, ADOPnTONS IN 1969: SUPPLEMENT
TO CHILD WELFARE STATISTICS 2 (1969).
14. Id. at Table 11.
15. Adoption Trends, supra note 2, at 404.
16. See note 7 supra. TEx. REV. CiV. STAT. ANN. art. 46a, § 8 (1969) specifically forbid-
ding interracial adoption, was declared unconstitutional in In re Gomez, 424 S.W.2d 656 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1967). For a discussion of the constitutional issues involved see Grossman, A Child
of a Different Color: Race as a Factor in Adoption & Custody Proceedings, 17 BUFF. L.
REv. 303 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Grossman].
17. Comment, Race as a Consideration in Adoption & Custody Proceedings, 1969 U. ILL.
L.F. 256, 258.
18. Grossman, supra note 16.
19. 424 S.W.2d 656 (Tex. Civ. App. 1967). This case involved a Negro married to
1971]
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ding interracial adoptions was declared unconstitutional, and the adop-
tion was granted. Such an adoption has also been granted in the District
of Columbia 20 where no statutory proscription existed. It is significant
to note that both cases involved a stepfather wishing to adopt his wife's
children who were already living in his home and who were being raised as
his own. Although there is language in the latter case indicating that the
racial factor alone could not be decisive in determining the child's wel-
fare, the court indicated its awareness of the fact that regardless of the
decision the child would continue to live in this home. Therefore, denial
of the adoption would serve only to deprive the child of legitimacy.2
Because of the great weight afforded an agency's recommendation
by the courts, its individual policies are often difficult to challenge. For
example, in Rockefeller v. Nickerson,22 a white couple sought to compel
the Commissioner of Welfare of New York to accept their application
for adoption of a Negro child. The couple claimed that their application
was rejected because of an "unwritten policy of the Department of Wel-
fare not to accept white foster parents for a Negro child. ' 2 The court
denied the couple's application and found that no policy against inter-
racial adoption existed. However, the opinion was void of any evidence
upon which this conclusion was founded. In applying the test of the
child's best interest, the court found the denial was not unreasonable
because the petitioners had five other children (three natural and two
adopted); that they were capable of having additional children; that
they had recently adopted another child; and that the mother planned
to continue in her job as a kindergarten teacher..2 1 In applying the test,
the court appears to have looked solely to the family situation without
giving consideration to the child's dilemma-would the child be adopted
by another couple or would he probably remain in an institution?
If no other placement appears likely, the court's objections in them-
selves appear to have little merit. Petitioners may have five children, but
an institution has far more. Although unspoken, it is obvious that racial
differences were a factor in the court's decision, and it is a legitimate
factor to be considered. Adoption is an area where racial difference
should not be totally disregarded. What should have been explored, how-
ever, was this family's fitness for an adopted child, plus how this child
would relate in a white home and white environment, as well as how
the mother of two white girls who had lived together with them as a family since 1958. The
trial court had found the home suitable for such adoption but denied it solely because of
the prohibition in the Texas statute. On appeal, the statute was found unconstitutional and
the adoption was granted.
20. In re Adoption of a Minor, 228 F.2d 446 (D.C. Cir. 1955).
21. Id. at 448.
22. 36 Misc. 2d 869, 233 N.Y.S.2d 314 (Sup. Ct. 1962).




the family and community would relate to him.25 While there are many
problems inherent in raising a child in an interracial home, there are just
as many problems inherent for him in growing up in an institution. The
problems and advantages of both must be weighed and evaluated in light
of the uniqueness of each individual child and a decision made in terms
which would most benefit the particular child. The premise that a white
family can provide a healthy and supportive environment for a black child
is not just arguable in theory; it has, in fact, been proven by agencies
which have made such interracial placements.26
C. Religion
Religion is mentioned specifically in adoption statutes far more fre-
quently than race. Over forty jurisdictions have some type of statutory
regulation pertaining to religion in adoption." Although most statutes
require that "when practicable" adopting parents be of the same religion
as the child, the actual words of the statutes appear of little consequence.
Each jurisdiction has interpreted them in its own way. Among the prob-
lems the court must resolve in applying these statutes are what is the
religious faith of the child, and how to construe the term "when prac-
ticable."28 Consequently, states that have the same statutory wording
differ in the practical application. The courts have taken three approaches
to this type of statute: 1) give it practically no effect, such as in Mis-
souri; 2) read a discretionary interpretation into it, as in Illinois and
Pennsylvania; or 3) as in Massachusetts, regard its dictates as mandatory.
Although the Missouri statute forbids adoption by persons of a re-
ligious faith different from that of the natural parents if another suitable
person can be found, it was held in In re Duren29 that "practicalities and
temporal considerations" must come first.
25. See generally Comment, Race as a Consideration in Adoption & Custody Proceedings,
1969 U. ILL. L.F. 256.
26. Grossman, supra note 16, at 333. These considerations are applicable when dealing
with any racial differences though the problem more frequently develops with black children
and white families than any other groups. The reverse situation of a black couple seeking
to adopt a white child is not explored here because there are few instances where the
problem develops, as there are generally too few white infants for families seeking them.
For a case allowing the petition of an American and his Japanese wife to adopt a child
of mixed English and Puerto Rican ancestry, see In re Adoption of Baker, 117 Ohio App. 26,
185 N.E.2d 51 (1962). The court considered the fact that the alternative available to this
child was to
remain an illegitimate orphan to be reared in an institution. Orphanages are all
well and good but they do not provide a real home with the attendant care, love
and affection incident to the relation of parent and child.
Id. at 28, 185 N.E.2d at 53.
27. Comment, The Religious Factor in New York Adoption Proceedings, 18 SltAcusa L.
REv. 825, 827 (1967).
28. Id. Since it makes little sense to speak of an infant as having a religion, the courts
generally determine the child's faith as being that of his natural parents or, at least, of his
natural mother.
29. 355 Mo. 1222, 200 S.W.2d 343 (1947).
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Minnesota, Pennsylvania, and Illinois consider religious identity as
an important, but not decisive factor."a In Stone Adoption,8 a Pennsyl-
vania court stated:
[I]n each instance, the court has discretion to determine pri-
marily whether the child's best interests are served by the adop-
tion, and in the exercise of that discretion the identity of religion
between the adopting parents and the natural parents is signif-
icant and desirable but not an exclusive factor.82
An Illinois court 3 used similar language in granting the adoption to
Presbyterian petitioners of twin girls, baptized Roman Catholic, even
though there apparently were other Catholic families seeking to adopt.84
Massachusetts' courts had regarded the religious factor in a manner
similar to the above group of states85 until the passage of a statute which
contained a "when practicable" clause. 6 Petition of Gally7 first inter-
preted this new statute and found that while there was a certain element
of compulsion that goes beyond the point where factors other than re-
ligion are in equal balance with it, the term "when practicable" carries
the thought of practical suitability in relation to existing condi-
tions .... All of the familiar tests are therefore still to be con-
sidered. Each case is to be determined on its own facts. The
difference is that, whereas before the new statute there was no
definite rule binding upon the judge in any set of circumstances as
to how much weight was to be given to any one of the several
elements as against the others, he is now bound to give con-
30. Cooper v. Hinrichs, 10 Ill. 2d 269, 140 N.E.2d 293 (1957) ; In re Adoption of Kure,
197 Minn. 234, 266 N.W. 746 (1936) ; State ex rel. Evangelical Lutheran Kinderfreund
Society v. White, 123 Minn. 508, 144 N.W. 157 (1913) ; Stone Adoption, 21 Pa. D. & C.2d
730, 10 Fiduciary 142, 57 Lanc. Rev. 51 (Orphan's Ct. 1960).
31. Stone Adoption, 21 Pa. D. & C.2d 730, 10 Fiduciary 142, 57 Lanc. Rev. 51 (Orphan's
Ct. 1960).
32. Id. at 735, 10 Fiduciary at 147, 57 Lanc. Rev. at 54.
33. Cooper v. Hinrichs, 10 Ill. 2d 269, 140 N.E.2d 293 (1957).
34. Id. at 278, 140 N.E.2d at 298.
35. Purinton v. Jamrock, 195 Mass. 187, 80 N.E. 802 (1907).
36. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 210, § 5B (1958):
In making orders for adoption, the judge when practicable must give custody only
to persons of the same religious faith as that of the child. In the event that there is
a dispute as to the religion of said child, its religion shall be deemed to be that of
its mother.
A 1970 amendment rewrote this section. The relevant portion now reads:
If, at the time of surrender of the child for adoptive custody, the parent or parents
of said child requested a religious designation for the child, the court may grant a
petition for adoption of the child only to a person or persons of the religious desig-
nation so requested, unless a placement for adoptive custody based on such request
would not have been in the best interests of the child. If a request for religious
designation is not given effect, such reasons in support of such determination shall
be made a part of the records of the proceedings.
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 210, § 5B (Supp. 1971). There have as yet been no court de-
cisions reported to indicate if this will in practice change the interpretation and effect of the
decision in Petition of Goldman. See note 40 infra and accompanying text.
37. 329 Mass. 143, 107 N.E.2d 21 (1952).
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trolling effect to identity of religious faith "when practicable,"
but not otherwise."8
The court concluded that it was not practicable to give custody of this
child to people of the same faith since there was no evidence that anyone
else was seeking to adopt this child or that anyone would offer to do so.89
Without overruling Gally, the Massachusetts Supreme Court tight-
ened its interpretation of "when practicable" two years later in Petitions
of Goldman.40 This case involved the adoption of twin girls born of a
Catholic mother who consented in writing to the adoption by petitioners
who were Jewish. The mother knew petitioners were Jewish and was
satisfied that the girls be raised in that faith. The twins, who were over
two years of age at the time of the case, had been in the petitioners cus-
tody from their second week of life. The lower court judge denied the
petition because
there are in and about the city of Lynn [which is near the resi-
dence of the petitioners] many Catholic couples of fine family
life . . . who have filed applications with the Catholic Charities
Bureau for the purpose of adopting Catholic children . ... .
On appeal, the court found that although there had been no definite proof
presented that suitable persons had actually seen these children and
were ready to adopt them together, the evidence did not fall so far short
as to warrant overruling the lower court judge.42
It is difficult to understand how this decision can be reconciled with
any interests other than those of the Catholic Church. Certainly the court
did not honestly evaluate the best interests of the twin girls who were
over two years old and had known no other family than petitioners. Even
assuming that these children might be placed in a Catholic home imme-
diately, the court did not discuss the trauma likely to result from such
a separation at this vulnerable stage in life. The children were too young
to have any true religion of their own, and their natural mother agreed
to have them raised in the Jewish faith. Therefore the state would have
no interest in the children being raised in a Catholic home, because in
every other way the petitioners were found to be a qualified adopting
couple.
New York has been considered to be in the same category as Massa-
chusetts in statutory interpretation of "when practicable". New York
38. Id. at 149, 107 N.E.2d at 25.
39. Id.
40. 331 Mass. 647, 121 N.E.2d 843 (1954), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 942 (1955).
41. Id. at 650, 121 N.E.2d at 844-45.
42. Id. at 651, 121 N.E.2d at 845. See also Ellis v. McCoy, 332 Mass. 254, 124 N.E.2d
266 (1955). While the quantum of evidence necessary to show there are other families of the
same religion in the area to adopt the children was found sufficient in Goldman, in Petition
of Duarte, 331 Mass. 747, 122 N.E2d 890 (1954), it was held that a judge may not take
judicial notice of this fact.
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also views the term as intending that "unless some compelling reason
requires otherwise no child shall be placed with a guardian of a religious
persuasion other than that of the child."4 Such a compelling reason was
found in In re Maxwell's Adoption,44 where the natural mother, a Catho-
lic, had represented in the consent agreement that she followed no relig-
ious faith, and petitioners, Protestants, had had the child for more than
four years and agreed to raise the child as a Catholic. The court reasoned
that it was cruel and harsh to sever the relationship that had developed in
these formative years.
A recent case decided in the Family Court of New York City indi-
cates that the strict interpretation may be changing. The court, in In re
C,45 granted the adoption of a two year old Puerto Rican boy, born of a
Catholic mother, to a Puerto Rican man who was Protestant and his Jew-
ish wife, after the Catholic agency had not found adoptive parents in five
weeks and could not assure any would soon be found. It was held that
Section 116(e) of the Family Court Act, 46 if literally applied, would pre-
clude a child's adoption by persons of another religion as long as custody
by an agency under the control of the child's religion was available,
regardless of what would serve in the child's best interest. The court
recognized, however, a delay of more than a month or two in placement
must be deemed detrimental to a child. In addition, such interpretation
would violate the fourteenth amendment equal protection clause and the
first amendment establishment clause and prohibition against interference
with the free exercise of religion.
Other than a limited parental right to express a religious preference
there appears to be no ground, consistent with the Constitution,
for attributing a religious preference to an adoptive child who
is below the age for actual religious training.47
Instead, the section must be construed to require placement with persons
of the same religion or with an agency controlled by such people "only
if such placement will neither preclude nor substantially delay their
adoption.1 4' This test is far more realistic in view of the child's welfare
than are the narrower interpretations discussed above.
43. Starr v. DeRocco, 29 App. Div. 2d 662, 663, 286 N.Y.S.2d 313, 315 (Sup. Ct. 1968),
aff'd, 24 N.Y.2d 1011, 250 N.E.2d 240, 302 N.Y S.2d 835 (1969).
44. 4 N.Y.2d 429, 151 N.E.2d 848, 176 N.Y.S.2d 281 (1958).
45. 63 Misc. 2d 1019, 314 N.Y.S.2d 255 (Family Ct. 1970).
46. N.Y. JuDcc.-CT. AcTs § 116(e) (McKinney 1963). This section provides that:
The words "when practicable" . . . shall be interpreted as being without force
or effect . . . if there is a duly authorized . . . society or institution under the
control of persons of the same religious faith or persuasion as that of the child, at
the time available and willing to assume the responsibility for the custody of or
control over any such child.
47. 63 Misc. 2d at 1027, 314 N.Y.S.2d at 264. For a discussion of the constitutional issues
of religious protection clauses, see List, A Child and a Wall: A Study of "Religious Protec-
tion" Laws, 13 BUFF. L. REV. 9 (1963); Comment, The Religious Factor in New York
Adoption Proceedings, 18 SYRACUSE L. REV. 825. (1967).
48. 63 Misc. 2d at 1029, 314 N.Y.S.2d at 266.
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Regardless of how a state construes its "when practicable" clause,
another problem arises in any statute mentioning religion; namely, how
to apply the statute to adopting applicants who are atheists. The consti-
tutional implications of denying applicants the opportunity to raise a
child because they do not subscribe to a belief in a Supreme Being seem
substantial. Additionally, the courts should be asking: Is it fair to children
who might have found a happy home to remain in an institution?
A recent New Jersey case is illustrative of the problem.49 Petitioners
sought to adopt an eleven month old child who had lived with them since
she was eight days old. The Bureau of Children's Services recommended
the adoption stating that petitioners were of high moral and ethical stand-
ards, and they had previously adopted another child. Although New
Jersey's statute has no requirement as to the religion of the adopting
parents, the court denied the petition concluding that the child's best
interests would not be promoted by the adoption. The court reasoned that
the child is a ward of the state and, under the doctrine of parens patriae,
the state has the duty to carry out the child's constitutional rights, one of
which is the right to worship God in any manner agreeable to the "dictates
of his own conscience." 50 "The child should have the freedom to worship
as she sees fit and not be influenced by parents or exposed to the views of
prospective parents who do not believe in a Supreme Being."'" Fortun-
ately, the New Jersey Supreme Court reversed the decision, finding that
religion was only one consideration among many to determine the fitness
of the adopting applicants.5 2
What purposes are served by making identity of religion, or even
any religion at all, so important in deciding the course of a child's life?
Why should a parent from whom all other rights have been terminated,
still retain the right to determine the religion in which a child should be
raised?5" If the alternative is to spend their formative years being shifted
from foster home to foster home-or to live in an institution-what can
be so compelling about safeguarding the religious lineage of a child? What
possible theory of religious identity can truly better serve the temporal
welfare of eich individual child than can placement in a loving home
atmosphere? To the same extent, why is it necessary that the parents
adopt any formal religion or belief in a Supreme Being? Certainly this
requirement cannot be supported on any theory that such a belief is essen-
tial to the development of moral and ethical principles. There are many
49. In re Adoption of "E," 112 N.J. Super. 326, 271 A.2d 27 (Essex County Ct., P.
Div. 1970).
50. N.J. CONST. art. I, g 3 (1947).
51. 112 N.J. Super. 326, 331, 271 A.2d 27, 30 (Essex County Ct., P. Div. 1970).
52. 59 N.J. 36, 279 A.2d 785 (1971). See especially Chief Justice Weintraub's concurring
opinion at 796.
53. Child Welfare League of America, Z. R. Turitz, A New Look at.Adoption: Current
Developments in the Philosophy and Practice of Adoption, February 19, 1965 (paper pre-
sented at CWLA Eastern Regional Conference), [hereinafter cited as NEw LOOK AT ADoP-
TION.].
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people who embrace a religion and are neither moral nor ethical. The
converse is equally true, as the Supreme Court has impliedly recognized
in its recent decisions involving the exemption of conscientious objectors
from the draft.5"
In the majority of placements, especially those involving white in-
fants, religious matching requirements have little effect on the child. But,
to the extent that such requirements ever block an adoption where in all
other respects the adopting petitioners are qualified, they are entirely
indefensible. Religious dogma is then put ahead of the only real quest in
any adoption-the best interests of the child.
D. Single "Parents"
Many statutes, including Florida's, are worded "[a] ny person . . .
may petition for leave to adopt," provided that a petition will not be
granted to a married person unless both husband and wife sign the peti-
tion.55 These statutes provide the basis for the "single parent" adoption,
a practice that has been gaining popularity in recent years. The "single
parent" adoption is also an area in which agency policy can be decisive,
sometimes negating the effect of statutory allowance."G
As yet, there are relatively few cases on point, and these generally
concern an adoption begun by a married couple where the husband died
before its completion, and the surviving widow seeks to continue it on her
own. Such a situation occurred in In re McDonald's Adoption,5 7 where
the child had been placed with foster parents at three weeks of age. The
husband committed suicide when the baby was eight months old. When
the agency demanded the return of the child, the widow refused and
petitioned for adoption. In granting the adoption over the agency's ob-
jection, the court found it would be injurious to the child to take it from
the home to be placed in an institution to await possible future place-
ment. 58
A similar case decided the same year in Wisconsin held the oppo-
site. 9 In that case, the husband died after the child had been with them
a year and after adoption proceedings had already begun. The trial court
found it in the child's best interest to remain with the adopting mother
over the agency's objection. On appeal, the decision of the trial court
was reversed, and the court held that although the statute permits adop-
54. See Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333 (1970), where it was held that if an
individual sincerely holds beliefs which are purely ethical or moral in source and content
but which impose upon him the duty of conscience to refrain from participating in war,
such an individual is entitled, to exemption as a conscientious objector as much as someone
who derives his conscientious objection to war from traditional religious convictions.
55. FLA. STAT. § 63.061 (1969). See, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9.422 (1965); GEN. LAWS
OF MD. ANN. art. 16, § 69 (1966); N.Y. CONSOL. LAWS § 110 (McKinney 1964).
56. See Section III infra on Florida practice in law and in fact.
57. 43 Cal. 2d 447, 274 P.2d 860 (1954).
58. Id. at 451, 274 P.2d at 862.
S9. In re Adoption of Tschudy, 267 Wis. 272, 65 N.W.2d 17 (1954).
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tion by single adult persons, it does not prohibit the withholding of con-
sent by any guardian or agency on the ground that the petitioner is a
single adult person. Therefore, the court had no jurisdiction to review
the reasonableness of a departmental policy forbidding adoption by such
single persons.60 There are instances where a child should not be left in
the home of one recently widowed; as, for example, where the emotional
environment might be detrimental to the child's best interest. The effects
of the death on the home and the ability of the surviving spouse to care
for and raise the child must be examined in each case. The length of time
the child has been with the family and the effect on the child of separat-
ing him from them at this time are also relevant factors. However, to
blindly enforce an agency policy against such adoptions, as was done in
McDonald, is to lose sight of the individual for the sake of an abstract
principle.
A similar situation is one in which a married couple files for adoption
but prior to a decision, obtain a divorce, and the wife seeks to continue
with the adoption. There are cases allowing and prohibiting such place-
ments.6 As in the situation where one spouse dies, there are valid con-
siderations that must be examined separately in each individual case to
determine the effect of the divorce on the family as a whole and on the
child in particular.
There are, as yet, no cases reported where a court has ruled on a
denial of the petition of a single non-relative adult who has never been
married. The closest case involves the father of an illegitimate boy who
sought to adopt and legitimatize the child.62 Although in granting the
petition the court based its decision on the legitimation of children by a
father,6 3 the case nevertheless provides an analogy to the single person
wanting to adopt a child. The child was a ward of the state, living in an
institution. The best interest test could easily have been applied here. The
same criteria used to decide what is in the child's best interest could be
as aptly applied with adoptions by single persons as with any adoption
petition.6 4
E. Age
Age qualifications are rarely mentioned in statutes,6" though for
obvious reasons agencies generally look for parents of child-bearing age.
60. Id. at 289-90, 65 N.W.2d at 26-27.
61. See In re Barnett's Adoption, 54 Cal. 2d 370, 354 P.2d 18, 6 Cal. Rptr. 562 (1960);
County of Los Angeles Dep't of Adoptions v. Superior Ct., 2 Cal. App. 3d 1059, 82 Cal.
Rptr. 882 (1969).
62. Lavell v. Adoption Institute, 185 Cal. App. 2d 557, 8 Cal. Rptr. 367 (1960).
63. CAL. CVL CODE § 230 (Deering 1960).
64. Adoption of an adult by a single person often occurs, but that is usually handled
separately by statute and is not within the province of this paper. Sce e.g., FLA. STAT. §
63.241 (1969).
65. Statutes sometimes mention a necessary age differential between adopter and adoptee,
but these are generally applicable for adoptions of adults. For example, FLA. STAT. § 63.241
(1969) provides that the adopting parent must be more than 10 years older than adoptee.
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The cases that arise usually deal with older couples who petition to adopt.
Florida has had several such cases and has ruled in favor of the older par-
ents. In one, the adoption of a 13 year old was granted to the child's 68
year old grandmother, where there had been prior custody and the consent
of both the father and child. 6 The court recognized that age was an im-
portant factor and that this was an unusual case of "remarkable circum-
stances" which would permit such adoption, but it stated that "[a]d-
vanced age, standing alone, will not serve as an automatic disqualification
of an adoption petitioner.16 7
Another case involving advanced age of the petitioner was In re
Duke.8 In this case a 48 year old husband and his 63 year old wife of
20 years sought to adopt the two and a half year old child who had lived
with them since she was one year old. The lower court denied the petition
primarily because of their age. In reversing, the Florida Supreme Court
found that the petitioners were in good health and had other qualities,
such as love and devotion which were more important and which were
the qualities that helped develop good character. 9
Two cases in other jurisdictions held the opposite. In both, the child
had spent a substantial amount of time in the petitioners' homes under
a foster parent program, yet when the couple wanted to adopt, they
were told they were too old. In a Maryland case, 70 the wife was 48 and
the husband 54. As foster parents they had nursed the child to health
since he was two months old. The court found that their age was satis-
factory for foster parents but not for adoptive parents. Though age would
not per se be a disqualification, it was an important consideration, because
in ten years the petitioners might be too old to effectively deal with the
child. The court held, however, that it would allow a subsequent petition
if the child was not adopted by a younger couple within six months.7' In
a Wisconsin case, the foster parents were 51 and 44. The court's refusal
to grant the petition was based in large part on an agency policy that a
young child should not be placed with people over 40. Moreover, the
court was aided by the fact that the agency had already found a "younger"
home for the girl.72
Age is an important consideration in determining a child's best inter-
ests, particularly where the child is young. A 55 year old mother would
be 70 in 15 years, a time when the child would be going through ado-
lescence, which is often a difficult stage requiring the guidance of a
66. In re Adoption of Christian, 184 So.2d 657 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1966).
67. Id. at 658.
68. 95 So.2d 909 (Fla. 1957).
69. Id. at 910. Accord., In re Adoption of Brown, 85 So.2d 617 (Fla. 1956).
70. Frantun v. Dept. of Public Welfare, 214 Md. 100, 133 A.2d 408 (1957), cert. denied,
355 U.S. 882 (1957).
71. Id. at 103, 106-07, 133 A.2d at 410, 412. The dissent argued that age should not have
been a decisive factor because of the great care petitioners had given the boy.
72. In re Shield's Adoption, 4 Wis. 2d 219, 89 N.W.2d 827 (1958).
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younger person. In addition, adoption by middle-aged or elderly couples
can create a relationship more like that of grandchild-grandparent than
that of parent and child."3 However, this comment is not directed to
the category of adoptions considered "easy placements"; it is concerned
with the hard to place, those who but for the adoption would be left in an
institution or wrenched away from foster parents who had provided the
only family they had known. It is more likely that an aged parent can
provide a child with more love and care than can an institution.
Since the early years are critical in a child's development, the per-
sonal care and attention the parents can give to this child is perhaps more
important than what the parents' age will be when the child is a teenager.
Furthermore, when concerned with a petition from older foster parents
who have already had custody of the child and now seek to adopt him,
the agency and court can readily evaluate the relationship and the effect
that advanced parental age would have on the child and his welfare in
general.
F. Handicapped Parents
There are very few cases involving adoptions by handicapped appli-
cants. An interesting one is In re Adoption of Richardson74 which in-
volved a deaf mute couple who, as guardians of another child, had raised
him successfully. The child in question was two years old and had been
nurtured by the petitioners since the second day of his life. The natural
mother had knowingly selected petitioners from several prospective par-
ents notwithstanding their handicap. The agency also consented. How-
ever, the trial court judge denied the petition on the grounds that it was
not a normal home. In reversing, the appellate court held that the denial
was made solely on the grounds that petitioners were deaf mutes and
was, therefore, a denial of fourteenth amendment equal protection and
due process. The decision was also based upon the best interests of-the
boy as there was medical testimony that when he was placed elsewhere
after the initial hearing, he immediately suffered adverse physical and
mental reactions.7
G. .Financial
In growing numbers, various states and child placement agencies
are becoming interested in placement of children not readily adoptable. 76
For some of these children legal complications do not free them for adop-
tion until they are past the "desirable age"; 77 others may require a spe-
73. Id. at 226, 89 N.W.2d at 831.
74. 251,Cal..App. 2d 222, 59 Cal. Rptr. 323 .(1967).
75. Id. at'239, 59 Cal. Rptr. at 334. .
76. See note 4 supra.
77. "Two4thirds of all children adopted by unrelated persons in'1969 were less- than
three months old when placed in an adoptive home. The median age at time, of placement.
0o71 ]
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cial treatment or diet due to some handicap or disease. Many of these
children have been living in foster homes. When they become free for
adoption, their foster parents may wish to adopt them, but may be unable
to do so without the financial aid they have been receiving; or they may
be unable to afford the additional cost of treatment necessary for the
care of a handicapped child. In an effort to place these children some
agencies have begun a program of subsidization and, recently, several
states have passed subsidy laws.7" The provisions of these laws vary.
Some laws, such as Minnesota and New York, are limited to foster par-
ents who adopt. 79 California's law is specifically limited to aid in adoption
of the hard-to-place child. 0 As a result of their three year pilot program,
the Crippled Children's Services have helped 100 children. Another 199
children were adopted without subsidy because of the interest generated
by the program.81
In addition to the advantage for the children, the state and taxpayer
benefit when a child is adopted. It is far more costly to provide either.
foster care or institutional housing than to provide an initial and gen-
erally limited subsidy. For example, in New York between September
1968, when its subsidy bill took effect, and June 1970, there were 302
subsidized adoptions (four percent of all agency adoptions). When
translated into dollars and cents, savings over the monthly foster care
rate amounted to an average of $8,550 per child or a total savings to the
state of $327,000 !82
Despite the apparent success of these first programs, "[t]he child
welfare field in general has been cautious in implementing subsidy
plans."8" This apparent reluctance to adopt subsidy plans may be attrib-
utable to a general societal attitude that parents should assume the full
financial responsibility for their children. Hopefully, as these subsidiza-
tion plans are implemented and tested, more and more agencies will
agree that
[i] f a child is not placed for adoption because of the financial
was 1.9 months." U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUCATION, & WELFARE, ADOPTIONS IN 1969: Sup-
PLEMENT TO CHILD WELFARE STATISTICS 2 (1969).
78. E.g., MD. LAWS 1969, ch. 135; MINN. LAWS 1969, ch. 244; N.Y. LAWS 1968, ch. 320;
S.D. LAWS 1970, ch. 154; WASH. LAWS 1971, ch. 63.
79. MINN. LAWS 1969, ch. 244; N.Y. LAWS 1968, ch. 320.
80. CAL. WELF. & INST'NS CODE §§ 16117, 16118 (Deering Supp. 1970).
81. STAFF REPORT, supra note 4, at 16.
82. Id. at 14. The following formula was used for determining the savings: "[t]he dif-
ference between the monthly board rate and the monthly subsidy was multiplied by 12 for
the months of the year and then by the number of years eliminated for each child through
adoption.
Total months
Monthly Foster _ Monthly covering the years
Care Rate Subsidy X for which foster -Savings"
care was eliminated
through adoption
83. Information Service of the Child Welfare League of America, Some Comments Re-
lated to Adoption Subsidies (February 1966).
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circumstances of a potentially good family, he will still have to
be supported by some agency, private or public, until he is
grown. Is it not better that he have that financial support in a
family which will give him the additional care and protection
inherent in good adoption placement?84
III. FLORIDA LAW AND PRACTICE
Florida's adoption law is found in chapter 63 of the Statutes. It is
similar to other statutes discussed herein in that it permits adoption by
single persons. 85 The only actual matching requirement is that
when practicable, the child and adoptive parents shall be of the
same religion; provided the natural parents may give written
consent to the placement of the child with adoptive parents
of a different religion.8"
There have been few reported cases applying Florida's statute and
those have been primarily concerned with the age of the adopting cou-
ple. 7 One interesting case, In re Adoption of Brown, dealt with both
age and religion.88 The couple were 57 and 53 years old, and while the
husband was Presbyterian, the wife was a psychic reader who held
"services" in her home two hours per week. The petitioners had had
custody of the boy since birth, and at the time of the petition he was two
years old. They had previously raised another adopted son and had been
considered good parents. The State Welfare Board recommended against
the approval of the adoption because of the adoptor's age and the "read-
ings," but the court held for the parents. It found that there was no evi-
dence that the psychic readings would be detrimental to the child's
welfare, and there is no statutory age limit in Florida.
While age is undoubtedly a factor to be evaluated by the
chancellor in ruling upon a petition of this nature, we are of
the opinion that the age of these petitioners should not, without
more, be held to bar the adoption, particularly where, as here,
the alternative seems to be placement of the child with a public
agency.89
It is interesting to note the court's awareness and consideration of
the likely alternative to this adoption, i.e., being placed with an insti-
tution. The boy was two at the time, which would put him in the hard-
84. Clover, Adoption for the Handicapped Child: Discussion, in Rrntucs 3x Ano oxr
204, 207 (Smith ed. 1963).
85. FLA. STAT. § 63.061 (1969).
86. Fr.A. STAT. § 63.011 (1969).
87. See section II E supra.
88. 85 So. 2d 617 (Fla. 1956).
89. Id. at 618.
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to-place category since the most desirable children are generally consid-
ered to be under one. In fact, in 1969, the median age of all children
placed in Florida was less than one month °0
The problem of the hard-to-place child is being recognized in Florida.
In 1969, 6,458 children were placed, of which 2,376 were adopted by a
step-parentY1 As of October 1969, 372 children were awaiting place-
ment, but because the child generally sought for adoption is under one
year and white, only 16.6 percent of this group was considered in de-
mand. Three hundred ten of them were considered hard to place because
of their race or age. Of the 62 children in the desired category, 22 had
a health problem that would render them not readily acceptable to adop-
tion applicants. That means that "of the 372 children awaiting adoption,
only 40 children or 10.7% are in demand.""2 The shortage of applicants
for black children "is so great that we must place our black and bi-racial
children in other states. Even then we are not able to place a sufficient
number of them."9" And yet, it appears that little has been done to study
the feasibility of making transracial adoptions. "Our division has placed
two negro/white [sic] children with families who were white but this
is not a general practice here in Florida.) 94
Although neither state statutes nor state agency policies restrict
single parent adoptions, very few have been made and of those the major-
ity were done by private agencies.9 5 Florida's Bureau of Children's Serv-
ices reports that "[w]e do not place children with single non-relative
white adults but have placed a few black children with single or widowed
negro women. '"90 The Staff Report on Adoption Services in the State of
Florida has suggested that the state agency should "manifest a policy
of encouraging single parent adoptions for the hard to place child."97
IV. A NEW CONCEPT OF "BEST INTERESTS"
Adoption proceedings involve the future of another human being,
a "child about whom precious little is known and for whom a court must
make a decision which in large measure will chart the course of his life,
irrevocably, for however long he lives."98 The importance of such a
decision makes it imperative that the court's foremost concern be the
temporal welfare of this individual child.
Courts and agencies alike state that the policy behind adoption
90. U.S. DEPT. OF HEALTH, EDuCATION & WELFARE, ADOPTIONS IN 1969: SuPPLEMENT TO
CHILD WELFARE STATISTICS, table 5 (1969).
91. STAFF REPORT, supra note 4, at 11.
92. Id. at 11.
93. Margaret Ward Letter, supra note 9.
94. Id.
95. STAFF REPORT, supra note 4, at 16.
96. Margaret Ward Letter, supra note 9.
97. STAFF REPORT, supra note 4, at 23.
98. List, A Child and a Wall: A Study of "Religious Protection" Laws, 13 Burr. L.
Rev. 9, 34 (1963).
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approval is the best interests of the child. Yet,- in many instances, this
is translated into meaning what is in the best interests of adoptive chil-
dren in general, rather than what is in a specific child's best interests.
The criteria behind a child's "best interests" must be given new mean-
ing. A child must be looked at as an individual and his individual needs
considered in view of the alternatives available to him.99 The question
becomes: If the child is not adopted by this person, is the child likely
to remain in an institution or be shuffled from one foster home to another?
If the latter alternative is likely, the various matching characteristics
used to find the model family become less important. Matched charac-
teristics such as race and religion may afford the child an environment
in which he can more easily adjust, but the significance of these environ-
mental considerations is overemphasized if the result is even one child
growing up in an institution or being repeatedly placed in numerous foster
homes. Such results can, in themselves, be highly detrimental to a child's
development.
Psychiatrists, psychologists, and social workers initially recog-
nized and emphasized the emotional damage and deprivation
suffered by infants and small children cared for in mass congre-
gate institutions and the equally damaging results of long-time
institutional care for children of all ages. Later, when foster
home placement was used indiscriminately, the same team of
practitioners documented the permanent personality damage
caused by repeated placement and the consequent trauma due
to lack of any sense of belonging to a permanent family group.100
There are always more adoptive applicants than approved homes,
and this is as it should be, but when dealing with a hard-to-place child
a closer look should be taken at the applicants who have not been
approved. The courts should be asking: Was this applicant denied be-
cause of arbitrary standards of a particular agency which require it to
turn applicants down on the basis of their age or single status? Certain
guidelines are helpful and even necessary in approving adoptive petitions,
but they should not be indiscriminately applied without regard to differ-
ing individual factors. Nor is it suggested that standards be relaxed to
the point where a child is placed with "any" family just to give him a
home. There are instances where a particular adoption truly is not in
the child's best interests,' 0 ' but this decision must rest on the individual
99. An example of the careful placement of two very "hard to place" children is ex-
plored by Taft, Adoptive Families for "Unadoptable" Children, in RiNnJGs IN ADoPTION,
237 (Smith ed. 1963).
100. D. ZIETZ, CHILD WELFARE: SERVICES AND PERSPECTIVES 101-110 (1969).
101. See, e.g., Van Kleek v. State Public Welfare Comm., 252 Ore. 497, 450 P.2d 549
(1969), where the adoption was denied to petitioner who had had custody of the child for
several years since birth because it was found petitioner, who had been married and divorced
three times (each time to a wife with a drinking problem) was unable to provide a stable
adoptive home. Although the court recognized the deep affection between petitioner and the
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
circumstances of the applicants and the child's individual characteristics,
not on arbitrary matching criteria. What is important is not that there
is a large degree of identity between the adoptive parents and the child,
but rather that the child is placed in a loving home with an atmosphere
conducive to healthy and normal development.
There are of course certain inherent difficulties with "non-matched"
adoptions, and these should be considered in each case before placement
is made. A black child will likely have certain identity problems in a
white family. But the problem inherent in being of a minority group will
be present regardless of whether or not he is adopted, and if adopted,
his parent can help him to better meet these obstacles with their love and
support.
Problems in resolving feelings about difference and identity can
be anticipated, and parents and child can be helped to cope with
them, whereas the alternative of having no emotional roots,
and repeated experiences of unsatisfying placements, may be
irreversibly damaging. 102
It is recognized that there are certain areas of the country where a trans-
racial placement would not be considered wise, even with a willing and
able family, because of the hostile atmosphere of the surrounding com-
munity. Nonetheless, there have been programs for interracial adoptions,
and they have thus far proved highly successful.'
Single parent adoptions offer a broader range of available homes
for the hard-to-place child, but, here too, certain guidelines are important
to insure that the single parent can offer the needed essentials. Some of
these standards differ somewhat from those required of two parent
applicants because of the unique problems that can arise with a single
parent. Characteristic standards with single parent adoptions include:
1. Opportunity for close contact with an extended family to:
a. provide substitute figure for absent parent.
b. provide substitute care if the single parent should be-
come ill.
2. Financial stability.
3. More emphasis on the question of sexual identification of
the single applicant.
4. Health status of the single applicant.
5. Motivation considered within the applicant's needs motivat-
boy, it concluded it was not in the child's best interest to grant this adoption in light of the
fact that he had been left unattended in locked cars and once in a hotel lobby by the third
wife. He had been subjected to numerous traumatic experiences, had a speech defect, and
was getting a late start in school.
102. A NEw LOOK AT ADOPTION, supra note 53, at 7.
103. Id. See also R. ISAAC, ADOPTING A CHILD TODAY 128-32 (1965).
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ing him to adopt a child taken in context of the total, bal-
anced configuration of his life pattern. 04
Under the expanded concept of "best interest" there is room to accomo-
date consideration of these unique problems and different standards in
each individual case.
V. CONCLUSION
The best interests of the child must always be the paramount con-
sideration in any placement, and these interests can best be met by
placement of the child with a family which can provide a healthy and
loving home environment. The best interests of the child for whom the
"matched" family is not available also dictate a loving home, but for
him these interests can only be met by exercising greater flexibility and
moving away from rigid artificial standards. For the hard-to-place child
"the choice is not the ideal, but something better than they would other-
wise have, something better than growing up without any permanent
family at all."'" 5
It is hoped that the stated policy behind all adoptions, i.e., that of
the child's best interests, will come to universally take on new meaning,
a meaning that views each child as a separate individual and which
includes the principle that
[n]o child should be deprived of the opportunity to have a
permanent family of his own because of age, religion, race,
nationality, place of residence, or handicaps that do not pre-
clude his being benefited by a family life.'
104. STAFF REPORT, supra note 4, at 16.
105. A New Look at Adoption, supra note 53, at 8.
106. AMERICAN ACADE Y OF PEDIATRICS, ADOPTION OF CHILDREN 15 (1967).
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